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Crisis Communication Operation Procedures Plan Essay


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Department of Defense Crisis Communication Operation Procedures Plan




In cases of dirty bomb detonation exercise, the government, the Pentagon, and the FEMA need to design proper communication mechanisms in order to avert any crisis. If proper planning does not take place, the nation would incur huge damages. The first step in developing a communication plan is by conducting a vulnerability audits (Bonn, & Baker, 2000, p. 3). This will help to avoid operational response breakdown as well as increase the awareness to the stakeholders involved in the process of evading crisis. Crisis management should be as effective as possible since they would affect the health of people. The management should be proactive when preparing for a crisis (Defense, 2009, p. 10). In this regard, they should put in place the Crisis Communication Teams in order to brainstorm potential crises. In addition, the defense department should train and identify the spokespersons during the crisis (Bonn, & Baker, 2000). Besides, they should establish the monitoring and notification systems such as instant SMS and phone calls as well as emails. Post-crisis analyses should focus on how to care for the affected people. In case there is a report of crisis such as dirty bomb detonation, the Crisis Communication procedures begin when the report is delivered to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) (Mallon, 2002).

The institute will explain when the event is recognized, the characteristics of the problem and related problems. The Department of Defense will be involved in the situation monitoring where the available data will be utilized such as strategic intelligence sources, routine observations, and television news broadcast (Defense, 2009). Moreover, the sources should follow a chain of command from a viewer to supervisor to high-ranking military personnel to unified command officer (Bullock, Haddow, & Coppola, 2012). However, the Pentagon through the cable news report first identifies and receives the report. Moreover, the occurrence of the detonation is assessed to determine the potential of adverse effects on the health and the interests of the U.S. nationals and national security (Gantz, & Philpott, 2013). A report of the occasion comes from different sources such as TV news or unit commander (Bonn, & Baker, 2000). Nonetheless, the focal point of reporting is the National Military Communication Center (NMCC) in Washington, D.C. Initially, the NMCC may use any means of reporting but the two crucial reporting methods are Critical Intelligence Report (CRITIC) and other OPREP-3 PINNACLE (OPREP-3P) (Gantz, & Philpott, 2013).

Faraday cage is also known as Faraday’s shield and is useful in protecting electronic devices from electromagnetic discharges and electromagnetic discharges. It protects people from electromagnetic pulse from the nuclear bomb detonation (Chandler, 2014). Faraday cage protects its components from static electric fields. An electric field is an energy field that surrounds a charged particle like proton or electron (Mallon, 2002). The structure is cage-like; hence, it absorbs electromagnetic charges and electromagnetic radiation and dispenses them to the exterior of the cage.

Electromagnetic radiation from the nuclear bomb detonation is ultraviolet, and undesirable, hence, it is a health hazard to the lives of human beings. If nuclear bombs were detonated a thousand miles above the United States, they would damage electronic components in the entire country (Defense, 2009). Indeed, it would influence the crucial infrastructure such as energy networks, communication networks, food and water distribution as well as human health (Bonn, & Baker, 2000). In this regard, Faradays cage plays an important role in canceling radiations or charges within its interior surface. It acts as a hollow conductor in which the radiations and charges remain on the external surface of the cage (Chandler, 2014). Electromagnetic pulse is caused by the detonation of a large bomb or nuclear arsenal.

The military operation uses a Faraday cage, which is basically a metal box, designed to soak up and divert the electromagnetic pulse. Faraday cage is simple and cheap since it provides shield to electrical machineries rather than hardening via circuit projects that are ineffective (Chandler, 2014). For the Faraday cage to protect effectively against charges and radiations, the equipment in the box should not touch the metal container. In addition, the metal shield should not have large gaps and extra-large holes in it (Defense, 2009). Faraday cage is extremely active in inhibiting EM/HPM forces from reaching vulnerable explosive and electronic components.

Exterior packaging is fabricated with wood or plastic material as well as fiber materials. However, the metal enclosure ensures that the EMP does not pass to the outside (Chandler, 2014). Aluminum foil is used to cover the metal shield that safely keeps the material inside during the nuclear or bomb detonation. Similarly, copper is used to insulate the whole room from electromagnetic pulse (Comfort, 2007). A wooden floor is also used to effectively contain the charges and radiations from the bomb.

Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) provides a common basis for discussion, change for joint force, understanding, and national leadership (Bullock, Haddow, & Coppola, 2012). Additionally, during the crisis action planning, the Joint Staff monitors the situation, evaluate the incoming reports, and analyses the Combined Intelligence Center (CINC) (Comfort, 2007). On the other hand, the Supported Command delivers crucial events to the NMCC and publishes CINC’s assessment such as major challenges, forces available, and actions being taken (Bonn, & Baker, 2000). Furthermore, the Subordinate and Supporting Commands collect intelligence information and provide information and support to military agencies. Finally, the USTRANSCOM assesses the development of the crisis.

Concisely, the CINC is responsible for military action involving the United States taken within a theater such as nuclear bomb detonation. The exchange of report in Phase I must be timely and accurate. The combatant commander issues OPREP-3 CINC/PINNACLE assessment to deliver information to a potential crisis (Bullock, Haddow, & Coppola, 2012). In case the CINC does not provide the preliminary report of the dirty bomb crises, the NMCC will make all efforts to develop communication with the CINC and demand a report (Bonn, & Baker, 2000).

During this initial phase of crisis communication, the CINC staffs review the appropriate contingency plans. The military uses Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) database that secures files for complete plans. All the plans are reviewed through access to the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) (Bonn, & Baker, 2000). For faster exchange of information, the Territory Logistic Center Forum (TLCF) ensures that GCCS Teleconference is established (Defense, 2009). Ultimately, phase I ends when the report from CINC is delivered to NCA and Chairman Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) via the NMCC.

Phase II of the crisis communication plan during dirty bomb detonation involves crisis assessment. In this respect, the Joint Chief of Staff and Nuclear and Chemical Agency (NCA) assess the circumstances to decide whether a military alternative would be designed to cope with the crisis (Defense, 2009). The second phase encompasses high rate of information collection and evaluation of available alternatives by the NCA.

Phase II starts when the CINC report is received and assessment of the event begins. The CINC classifies the evolving problem as of probable problematic to the nation and its citizen. The agency gives comprehensive report to the Chairman and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This provides needed information to enable them to offer sound military advice to the NCA (Bonn, & Baker, 2000). Therefore, the NCA evaluates the national interests that are likely to be affected during the crisis. It also considers the national objectives associated with the dirty bomb detonation (Gantz, & Philpott, 2013). Moreover, it evaluates diplomatic, military, economic, political alternatives to achieve such objectives. In case a military crisis exists, the CINC establishes military Course of Action (COA) (Bullock, Haddow, & Coppola, 2012). Additionally, the CJCS evaluates the circumstance from the military perspective such as logistics, operations and command, and maintenance implications.

It also reviews contemporary strategy and current Operational Plan (OPLAN) information in JOPES. The Joint Staff evaluates and reviews information from the CINC. Recommendations may be delivered by the CJCS concerning orders to formulate how to organize military personnel and how to establish direct institution of the crisis GCCS TLCF in case the CINC does not work on it (Bonn, & Baker, 2000). Moreover, the CINC endures to provide status updates, evaluates the nature of allocated and accessible forces and receipts necessary armed measures pursuant to the contemporary rules of engagement (Comfort, 2007).

The rest of the members of the JPEC continuously monitor the circumstances. For instance, Services increases the sustainability that helps to identify the reserve components while Commander in Chief, the United States Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS) increases the readiness and disposition of strategic lift assets (Bonn, & Baker, 2000). The CJCS and NCA increase the rate of reporting and gather more information concerning the dirty bomb detonation crisis (Bullock, Haddow, & Coppola, 2012). The two agencies return to Phase I, where they continue to monitor the circumstances of the crisis without any further planning.

Special teams are assembled such as Crisis Response Organization at all stages where the crisis and its perseverance are being established. The squads have varying size, names, and structure. The Crisis Response Organization members include representatives of all command staff divisions (Bullock, Haddow, & Coppola, 2012). Furthermore, the CAP and NCA exchanges reports that help to design selected units for appropriate armed actions. They promote the unit enthusiasm by establishing alert settings or demanding a particular deploy ability posture. This is aimed at minimizing time of response.

However, actions to improve readiness can take place at any phase.  Deployments Preparation Orders are applicable to improve or minimize deployability posture (Mallon, 2002). They also develop or undeveloped joint task force and headquarter or indicate to the U.S. intentions to terminate or undertake actions. CJCS issues the two orders and particularly authorized by the Secretary of Defense (Bonn, & Baker, 2000). The Deployment Preparation Orders are addressed to all the combatant commanders and the Central Security Services or National Security Agency. Copies are delivered to the White House Situation room and the Secretary of the State.

JOPES contains all the necessary information to deploy the forces in cases the CJCS documents does not provide guidance documents. The crisis phase terminates with the choice by the NCA military alternatives developed for their considerations (Defense, 2009). They are provided to complete spectrum of necessary U.S. reactions.

The choice by NCA involves a specific guidance on COAs to be established. Therefore, the initial assessment by the CINC has a lot of effect. That assessment is an initial professional development from the theater. In case there is no alternative, the CINC’s assessment is the only option that is available and considered (Comfort, 2007).

Phase III involves development of a course of action (COA). The CJCS distributes a Warning Order after the decision of the NCA to establish military options. The order directs the establishment of COAs following the dirty bomb detonation. The COA establishment phase demands change importance to the CINC, who then establishes and delivers recommended NCA and CJCS from COAs (Bonn, & Baker, 2000). The third phase begins with the NCA decision to establish appropriate military resolutions to the crisis. The response from the military may be one of the alternatives open to the NCA.

Indeed, the early hesitancy to practice military powers may significantly change the situations; hence, edge the accessible military alternatives when such decisions are finally made. Measures taken during an establishment of COAs change to support commander.  CJCS issues a Warning Order to give necessary direction to the JPEC and demands that the CINC give recommendation on COA to satisfy the circumstances (Gantz, & Philpott, 2013).

The supported commander establishes COAs which encompasses supporting and subordinate commanders. CINC uses the Evaluation Request Message to assign commands to identify the forces and resources for COA beings evaluated. In case security and time allow, subordinate assessment of tentative COAs is important (Comfort, 2007). Prevailing Concept of Operation Plan (CONPLANs) and Operation Plan (OPLANs) are important in the prompt establishment of the COAs. The databases that explain the movement of forces and sustainment can be accessed via supported commander to the JPEC (Bonn, & Baker, 2000). Ultimately, the CINC develops the Commander’s Estimate via recommendation from the COAs.

The supporting and subordinate commanders reply to the CINC through an Evaluation Response Message. Other options on COA are analyzed and forces are developed to support the operation. The prevailing plans in the JOPES database are useful since a list of forces for this operation can be established in the databases (Bullock, Haddow, & Coppola, 2012). Sustainment planning begins with proper management between the scene of the dirt bomb and the Service headquarter. The Services manages the force readiness and deployment planning.

Phase IV encompasses consultations with other participants of the Joint Chief of Staff analyses, evaluates the Commander’s Evaluation and placement estimates, and finally grants COAs according to significance to the NCA for their choice. CJCS acts as a principal military adviser to the NCA (Defense, 2009). It also evaluates the recommendation from COA in consultation with CINC and other participants of the Joint Chief of Staff. Based on CJCS recommendations to the NCA, it may decide to issue direction to the JPEC and CINC with a preparation order that helps to fasten the implementation planning and does not change proper NCA approval (Gantz, & Philpott, 2013). The NCA and the COA begins formal execution.

The exchange of information in Phase IV depends on the circumstance since the two services may be exchanged at this phase. NCA makes a decision after the CJCS publishes a planning order. The aim of fast execution is to respond to the fast-breaking event as the crisis develops. The planning order establishes the first communication between JPEC and JPEC during the crisis (Bullock, Haddow, & Coppola, 2012). CJCS publishes an alert order to the CINC that acts as a source of advice to the selected COA.

Phase V encompasses the implementation of planning phase. In this phase, the supported commander changes the NCA-selected course of action into an operation order (OPORD). This phase helps develop planning in order to carry out approved COA as directed by the NCA (Defense, 2009). This requires strategic transportation, sustainment, and actual forces that help in strategic transportation resources. The NCA direct timely establishment of OPCORD during the execution phase. OPORD is established by altering the current OPLAN, intensifying CONPLAN or generating an OPORD from scratch. CINC reviews the development of the OPORD implemented by the CINC, which is facilitated by JOPES. It also resolves drawbacks that are available (Bonn, & Baker, 2000). CJCS also evaluates the ultimate products for sufficiency and viability and offers military guidance to the NCA and the prominence of the circumstances (Gantz, & Philpott, 2013).  OPORD is the product of accomplishment planning. Joint Publication describes it directive issued by the leader to junior commanders for implementation of coordinated operations.

Joint Publication gives the necessary format for the execution of the operation. The supported commander issues a Letter of Instruction that provides procedure for execution of the operation. The JPEC participants continue to apply the GCCS for communicating between the military personnel (Defense, 2009). The GCCS permits quick, secure, and accurate data transfer at ensure access to file updating. The participants use the secure voice systems such as AUTODIN to communicate or exchange important data and files. Phase V ends when the NCA plans to execute the OPORD, cancel it or keep it pending by some other means.

Phase VI is the execution stage (Bonn, & Baker, 2000). It begins with the NCA verdict to select the military alternative to tackle the crisis and implement the OPORD. The Secretary of Defense will provide an Execute Order that allows the CJCS to order the CINC to execute the OPORD. The CINC will implement the OPORD, issues supporting, and subsidiary commanders to implement their auxiliary OPORDs (Comfort, 2007). The Executive Order is a form of directive that offers further guidance, intensifying orders and instructions. During the implementation, the Supporting and supported commanders, defense agencies and services and new data to the JOPES placement databases (Defense, 2009). USTRANSCOM coordinates and manages the placement per the supported force of commander and providing significances.

During execution, the military agencies may change the initial plan because of intelligence and tactical considerations, presence of strategic lift assets, force and non-unit cargo availability and POE capabilities (Comfort, 2007). Therefore, the relevant agencies provide continuous adjustment and refinement of requirements and schedules as well as close monitoring and coordination of deployment activities (Bonn, & Baker, 2000). They also determine how the Faraday cage will be constructed for the benefit of government and its citizens. JOPES should contain information on how to prevent the electromagnetic pulse from interfering with the lives of human beings.

It should also provide information concerning the time when the OPORD will be implemented. It will offer information on the support of combat, and integrate critical resupply requirements such as supply agencies including LAD and POD. Practical considerations for development of Faraday’s cage and other necessary measures concentrate on the first 7 days. Moreover, major changes are implemented after scheduling process is carried out (Comfort, 2007). Nonetheless, significant changes in the timely development of the crisis communication procedure may drastically affect the development procedure.


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Bullock, J., Haddow, G., & Coppola, D. (2012). Introduction to homeland security. Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Chandler, N. (2014). Retrieved 18 October 2014, from http://file:///C:/Users/paul/Downloads/How%20Faraday%20Cages%20Work%20-%20HowStuffWorks.htm

Comfort, L. K. (2007). Crisis management in hindsight: Cognition, communication, coordination, and control. Public Administration Review, 67(s1), 189-197.

Defense, U. (2009). The Dictionary of Military Terms. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, Inc.

Gantz, S., & Philpott, D. (2013). FISMA and the risk management framework. Boston: Syngress.

Mallon, J. (2002). Military Commissions and the Interagency Process – Putting the Cart Before the Horse. Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center.